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Abstract
Background: Medical devices increasingly depend on computing functions such as wireless communication and Internet
connectivity for software-based control of therapies and network-based transmission of patients’ stored medical
information. These computing capabilities introduce security and privacy risks, yet little is known about the prevalence of
such risks within the clinical setting.
Methods: We used three comprehensive, publicly available databases maintained by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to evaluate recalls and adverse events related to security and privacy risks of medical devices.
Results: Review of weekly enforcement reports identified 1,845 recalls; 605 (32.8%) of these included computers, 35 (1.9%)
stored patient data, and 31 (1.7%) were capable of wireless communication. Searches of databases specific to recalls and
adverse events identified only one event with a specific connection to security or privacy. Software-related recalls were
relatively common, and most (81.8%) mentioned the possibility of upgrades, though only half of these provided specific
instructions for the update mechanism.
Conclusions: Our review of recalls and adverse events from federal government databases reveals sharp inconsistencies
with databases at individual providers with respect to security and privacy risks. Recalls related to software may increase
security risks because of unprotected update and correction mechanisms. To detect signals of security and privacy
problems that adversely affect public health, federal postmarket surveillance strategies should rethink how to effectively
and efficiently collect data on security and privacy problems in devices that increasingly depend on computing systems
susceptible to malware.
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Introduction
Medical devices play a growing role in the care of millions of
patients worldwide.[1,2] Devices for diseases ranging from heart
failure to diabetes improve patient outcomes and may ease disease
management.[3] Recent innovations in medical device design
include more complex diagnostics and the storage of patient data.
In many cases, this information can be transmitted directly to
physicians or indirectly through a third-party provider, sometimes
using wireless systems, to assist with diagnosis and management of
chronic medical problems. At present, information flow between
implanted devices and providers is predominantly unidirectional
(from device to provider). Theoretically, however, current
technologies could easily be modified such that remote interactions
between providers and medical devices (e.g. to reprogram an
insulin pump or pacemaker) would be possible. The possibility of
hacking into an insulin pump was recently demonstrated by a
Type 1 diabetic on his own device.[4].
The rapid dissemination of medical devices capable of storing
and transmitting patients’ medical information and the theoretical
possibility of remotely reprogramming implanted medical devices
raise important concerns regarding security, privacy, and
safety.[5] Investigators have demonstrated limitations of the
security functions for implantable cardioverter-defibrillators
(ICDs), for example, by proving the feasibility of communicating
with an ICD through an unauthorized radio-based approach that
theoretically could interfere with appropriate device therapy.[6]
While there are hundreds of confirmed reports of conventional
computer viruses infecting medical devices in radiology, cardiac
catheterization labs, sleep labs, and other clinical departments,
there are no known case reports of malevolent interference that
specifically target medical device function.[7,8] A growing list of
confirmed cybersecurity vulnerabilities in medical devices pose
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 July 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 7 | e40200challenging risks to patients whose privacy or disease management
depends on the proper functioning of devices.
In the United States, post-market surveillance of medical
devices identifies potential risks and connects device malfunction
to adverse events in patients. Post-market events may trigger
recalls or advisories depending on the nature of the device
problem that is identified.[9] These reports may provide important
information about safety and effectiveness, and have led to revision
of regulatory practices for devices such as ICD leads and
automated external defibrillators.[10,11].
In order to better understand the security vulnerabilities of
marketed medical devices, we performed an analysis of recalls and
adverse events, which we adjudicated to identify post-market
actions related to security or privacy, and to identify specific
features of devices at risk for recalls with security implications.
Methods
We used publicly available databases maintained by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). Figure 1 summarizes the
different sources leveraged for our analysis.
FDA Enforcement Reports
In order to identify a comprehensive denominator of medical
device recalls, we accessed publicly available weekly enforcement
report listings on the FDA website.[12] These reports are
published on a weekly basis and contain information regarding
actions emerging from agency regulation. Actions include Safety
Alerts and Recalls. Safety alerts are communications issued by a
manufacturer, distributor, or other responsible party or the FDA
to inform health professionals or other appropriate persons or
firms of a risk of substantial harm from a medical device in
commercial use. Recalls are issued by the FDA when a reasonable
likelihood of causing harm exists, and are classified according to
the likelihood of causing patient harm. Class I recalls are the most
serious, indicative of situations in which there is a ‘‘reasonable
probability that the use of or exposure to a violative product will
cause serious adverse health consequences or death.’’ Class II and
III recalls are less serious. Enforcement reports may also include
notice of civil or criminal proceedings or seizures of products.
FDA Enforcement Reports from January 2009 through May of
2011 were reviewed, and all actions other than recalls related to
medical devices (such as those specific to food or drugs) were
excluded. Reports were manually searched for agency actions
related to medical devices, and details from each report were
extracted. These features included the specific device and device
type, organ system, manufacturer, date and class of recall,
estimated volume of distribution, and the reason for the recall
itself. We categorized these reasons as follows: sterility/contami-
nation; mechanical failure; electrical failure; software failure;
computer hardware failure; instruction or manual mislabeling;
unapproved usage; incorrect shelf life; or naming problems. We
also categorized each device according to specific features
including: permanent implantation; inclusion of a computer;
ability to communicate wirelessly; and storage of personal data.
Similarly, each recall was adjudicated as to whether or not the
reason for recall was related to these specific functions (e.g.
personal data storage, wireless communication, etc.).
Device Recalls
The FDA also hosts a public, searchable database of Medical
and Radiation Emitting Device Recalls, which houses information
related to recalls of medical devices since November 2002.[13]
Information that can be extracted from this database includes the
date and a narrative explanation of the reason for the recall and
details of actions taken by the manufacturer. The FDA recall
database can be searched by date, manufacturer, recall class or
number, or the reason for recall using a free-text search window.
Terms such as ‘‘battery failure’’, ‘‘labeling’’, ‘‘sterility’’, etc. can be
used to identify recalls related to specific problems or malfunctions
with a device. We searched using ‘‘security’’ and ‘‘privacy’’ as
search terms to identify recalls where either of these elements were
considered central or important.
Adverse Event Reports
Lastly, we used the Manufacturer and User Facility Device
Experience (MAUDE) database to look for adverse events related
to security or privacy problems.[14] The MAUDE database was
established through the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, and
requires sites where medical devices are used (hospitals, nursing
homes, physicians’ offices, etc.) to report device-related fatalities
and serious adverse events directly to FDA as well as to the
manufacturers.[15] Since 1995, these reports have been stored in a
searchable, publicly available database. This database is used for
FDA analysis and is also available to independent researchers. The
majority (.90%) of these reports come from manufacturers, with
the remainder submitted by user facilities, such as hospitals and
outpatient clinics or individual physicians. Manufacturers are
required to report any adverse events that are communicated to
them verbally or in writing. These reports include details related to
the device type and model number, timing and location of adverse
events, clinical details, and description of the manufacturer’s
analysis of the device (if available).
MAUDE can be searched using its advanced interface, which
provides a drop-down menu of ‘‘product problems’’ from which to
Figure 1. Summary of Sources for Search Strategy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040200.g001
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product problem terms. These were manually searched and
evaluated for inclusion of ‘‘security’’ and ‘‘privacy’’, and each term
was also evaluated individually for a plausible relationship to either
theme. Any adverse events mapped to those search terms related
to security or privacy were then reviewed in detail. Adverse events
from January 1, 2000 through November 30, 2011 were included
in the searches.
Software Recalls Analysis
Preliminary analysis of enforcements reports identified software
related recalls as a particularly prevalent problem with potential
security and safety ramifications. Thus, all software-related recalls
were identified using the searchable FDA recall database between
2002 and 2010 for those recalls that included the word ‘‘software’’
in their reason for recall. The results included Class I, II, and III
recalls. For each of these software related recalls, we determined
whether the recall cited problems in the software itself as the
reason for the recall, as opposed to problems with labeling alone.
We noted whether the recall mentioned that a software update was
to be issued and whether this software update was mentioned as
being available online, or explicitly mentioned as not being
available online. We also recorded whether the software update, if
available, involved a manufacturer representative visiting the
installation site or return of a device to the manufacturer by mail.
Results
Enforcement Reports
We identified 1845 recalls issued from January 2009 to May
2011 from the weekly enforcement reports listings. TABLE 1
summarizes the categorization of recalls by organ system and
etiology. For all recalls of the organ systems or usages involved
most commonly were laboratory/pathology (294, 15.9%), ortho-
pedic (279, 15.1%), cardiovascular (250, 13.5%) and general
hospital (225, 12.2%). The most common reasons for recalls were
mechanical problems (918, 49.8%) and software problems (279,
15.1%).
Permanent implants were the subject of 241 (13.1%) recalls. Of
the recalled devices, 605 (32.8%) included computers, but only 35
(1.9%) stored patient data and 31 (1.7%) were capable of wireless
communication. Though storage of patient data and wireless
communication were relatively uncommon features of implanted
devices, these features were often adjudicated to be responsible for
recalls of devices utilizing them. For example, 301 (49.8%) of
devices with computers that were recalled had computing
functions as the reason for the recall itself. Six (17.1%) of the 35
devices storing patient data had recalls originating from this
function, and 6 (19.4%) of the 31 devices using wireless
communication had recalls originating from this function.
An example of one of the enforcement reports (from November
2010) is for a PC Unit for use with infusion and monitoring
systems. The reason for the recall provided in the report is:
‘‘Under certain wireless network conditions a communication
error can occur, which freezes the PC Unit screen, which may
result in a delay of therapy. A delay of therapy may result in
serious injury and/or death’’.[16]
An example of a software related enforcement report corre-
sponds to an ultrasound system. The reason for the recall is listed
as: ‘‘The product has a software problem in which previous patient
measurement data gets associated with another patient’s image’’.
[17]
Recall Searches
‘‘Security’’ as a search term for recalls returned only one
finding. This was a Class II recall, for a radiation oncology system
including a console and software to confirm proper patient
positioning for therapy. The MAUDE report for this recall was
incomplete, but alluded to a failure of security measures designed
to restrict access to the console (incomplete sentence quoted
verbatim): ‘‘The Operator Station Calibration panel provides
access to view and modify machine specific configuration settings.
Access to these settings has always been restricted to individuals
with appropriate security rights, being limited to only the
‘Superuser’ and ‘Field Service engine’’’.[17] ‘‘Privacy’’ did not
return any reported adverse events.
MAUDE Searches
Manually searching the advanced interface of MAUDE yielded
‘‘Computer system security problem’’; ‘‘patient data issue’’; and
‘‘unauthorized access to computer system’’ as the only terms (out
of nearly 1000) that were related by title to security and privacy
Table 1. Characteristics of Weekly Enforcement Reports, 2009–2011 (N=1845).
Common organ system/usage Laboratory/pathology (294, 15.9%)
Orthopedic (279,15.1%)
Cardiovascular (250, 13.5%)
General Hospital (225, 12.2%)
Radiology (164, 8.9%)
General Surgery (121, 6.6%)
Permanent Devices 241 (13.1%)
Devices with computer functions 605 (32.8%)
Devices capable of wireless communication 35 (1.9%)
Storage of personal data 31 (1.7%)
Selected recall reasons Mechanical Problem (918, 49.8%)
Software problems (279, 15.1%)
Instruction or manual mislabeling (268, 14.5%)
Sterility/contamination (185, 10.0%)
Electrical failure (82, 4.4%)
Computer hardware failure (17, 0.9%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040200.t001
Security and Privacy in Medical Devices
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 July 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 7 | e40200features of devices. Adverse events from each of these terms from
January 1, 2000 through November 30, 2011 were reviewed.
Importantly, despite categorization in MAUDE under these
headings, review of the specific adverse events revealed that only
one of them was actually related to privacy or security in even a
tangential way. TABLE 2 describes the exact contents of each
MAUDE entry, including the device type and manufacturer
narrative of the device problem. These are of variable detail (see
TABLE 2), and range from no data at all (as with the ‘‘powered
wheelchair’’ entry included under ‘‘computer system security
problem’’ and specifics of an esophageal implant problem
categorized as ‘‘patient data issue’’. ‘‘Computer system security
problem’’ yielded 4 reports, none of which on review was related
to either computers or security. ‘‘Patient data issue’’ yielded 5
reports, only one of which clearly had security and/or privacy
implications. In the one pertinent ‘‘patient data issue’’ case, a
remote monitoring system for an implantable cardioverter-
defibrillator routed patient information to a physician practice
from which the patient no longer received follow-up care.
‘‘Unauthorized access to computer system’’ did not yield any
reports.
Software Related Recalls
From 2002 through 2010, 523 of the 537 recalls (97.4%) that
mentioned the word ‘‘software’’ cited software specifically as the
reason for the recall. Of these, 428 (81.8%) mentioned a software
upgrade, and only 258 (49.3%) described upgrade instructions.
Thirteen (2.5%) of the recalls due to software mentioned that a
software upgrade would be available online. Nine (1.7%)
mentioned that a software upgrade would not be available online.
No Class I (high risk) recalls mentioned online updates; only five
(1.0%) Class I recalls provided specific instructions for providers to
upgrade software. Most Class I recalls were mitigated by
manufacturer representatives upgrading software via either site
visits or return shipping.
To further test the effectiveness of the FDA Safety Information
and Adverse Event Reporting Program (MedWatch Form 3500)
for reporting security and privacy problems, one co-author
submitted a software vulnerability report for an automated
external defibrillator on July 19, 2011.[18] As of January 19,
2012, the report had not yet been processed into MAUDE. In
April 2012, MAUDE was found to contain the report for the event
under report number MW5023578. The report processing took
nine months. As the time from discovery of a conventional
computer security vulnerability to the global exploitation of the
flaw is often measured in hours, a nine month processing delay
may not be an effective strategy for ensuring the security of
software-based medical devices.
Discussion
This study evaluated postmarket events in medical devices
related to security and privacy using complementary databases
compiling enforcement reports, recalls, and adverse events.
Detailed review of enforcement reports revealed that recalls of
devices with computers were common, though features such as
wireless communication and storage of personal data were less
common in those recalled devices. The FDA recall database did
not yield any recalls related to patient security or privacy over a 9
year period of analysis. While the lack of any security or privacy
concerns through these two mechanisms may be reassuring, it
seems more likely that the current recall classification scheme does
not adequately capture device malfunctions of this type. In
addition, it is concerning that processing an adverse event report
may take several months, given that a global exploitation of a
security and privacy vulnerability may spread in a shorter period
of time.
Our results also contrast with databases that track security and
privacy problems for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA).
The Field Security Office in the Office of Information Security at
the VA collects statistics on the prevalence of malicious software
(malware) infections within its 156 medical centers. Between
January 2009 and December 2011, the VA detected 142 separate
instances of malware infections affecting 207 medical devices
found in radiation oncology, radiology, clinical lab, GI lab,
ophthalmology imaging, cardiology imaging, pharmacy, sleep lab,
cardiac catheterization lab, pulmonary, dental, audiology, dicta-
tion, and neurology.[8] A common outcome was the unavailability
of care because of computer outages. In one extreme instance, a
computer virus infection in a catheterization lab required
transport of patients to a different hospital. Common causes of
infections include use of the Internet and USB flash memory drives
from vendors who are paradoxically updating software on medical
devices. In one instance, a factory-installed device arrived already
infected with malware. All detected malware pertained to
conventional computer viruses rather than malware customized
for medical devices. The most prevalent malware converted the
medical devices into becoming nodes of ‘‘botnet’’ criminal
networks. Organized crime rents out botnets for others to
distribute spam anonymously and for mounting targeted attacks
on information infrastructure.
We believe that the inconsistency between databases is due to
lack of a meaningful and convenient reporting mechanism, but we
also believe that clinicians without expertise in computer security
are unlikely to recognize the difference between a virus infection
and a crashed or slow computer. Time pressure, lack of incentives,
lack of federal safe harbor policies, and lack of clear actionable
guidance likely further reduce the probability of incident reporting
by clinicians and information technology staff.
Similarly, our review of the MAUDE database of adverse event
reports did not identify any events related to privacy or security,
despite inclusion of nearly 1000 possible product problems to
facilitate targeted searching. Again, the negative findings here may
be viewed in two ways. The absence of a glaring safety signal
provides some reassurance that, for example, unauthorized access
to patient information does not appear to be rampant. However,
our manual review of the entire list of search product problems –
from ‘‘abnormal’’ to ‘‘Y2K related problem’’[14] – found only a
handful of terms with a prima facie connection to security or
privacy. This again suggests that the classification of postmarket
events may not be well-positioned to prospectively collect security
or privacy related problems. The detailed, verbatim review of the
actual information provided in those adverse reports which
mapped to security or privacy terms (TABLE 2) raises suspicions
that current surveillance mechanisms may be insufficiently tailored
to these specific problems.
This same concern is demonstrated in part by our findings
related to software recalls. Most of these recalls indicated that a
software update would be issued to correct the problem in
question, but the mechanism of update itself remained unclear.
These mechanisms might include web/internet based solutions,
direct interventions by field engineers, or other interventions, each
of which might introduce security risks. Our review of adverse
events, however, suggests that even if an event were to occur –
such as failure to update properly or deliberate interference with a
software update – the current classification of ‘‘product problems’’
might not categorize these events clearly.
Security and Privacy in Medical Devices
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Product
Problem
category Event Date Device Type Device/Manufacturer Verbatim Text
Adjudicated
Security or
Privacy
Implications?
‘‘Computer system security issue’’
9/29/2011 Powered
wheelchair
INVACARE TAYLOR
STREET POWERED
WHEELCHAIR
890.3860
None No
4/8/2010 Orthopedic
implant
DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS,
INC. ENDURON NEUT
54OD X 28ID
Manufacturer Narrative No
This complaint is still under investigation. Depuy will
notify the fda of the results of this investigation once
it has been completed.
Event Description
Enduron liner has failed. Excessive wear causing
extensive osteolysis.
2/9/2010 Orthopedic
implant
DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS,
INC. AMK PATELLA 8.5 X
34MM 87 JWH
Manufacturer Narrative No
This complaint is still under investigation. Depuy will
notify the fda of the results of this investigation once
it has been completed.
Event Description
Pt was revised to address femoral and tibial loosening.
Poly wear and osteolysis were discovered intraoperatively.
1/11/2010 Orthopedic
implant
DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS,
INC. UNKNOWN DEPUY
DURALOC LINER TOTAL
HIP REPLACEMENT
The devices associated with this report were not returned.
Review of the device history records and/or a complaint
database search was not possible as the product and lot
codes required were unavailable. The investigation could
not draw any conclusions regarding the reported event
with the info available. Based on the investigation, the
need for corrective action is not indicated. Depuy
considers the investigation closed at this time. Should the
product and/or additional information be received to
change the outcome of the performed investigation,
the complaint will be re-opened.
No
Event Description
Patient was revised to address femoral stem loosening.
Poly wear and osteolysis were discovered intraoperatively.
‘‘Patient data issue’’
6/3/2011 Cardiac device
monitoring
system
MEDTRONIC, INC.
PACEART SYSTEM
SOFTWARE
Manufacturer Narrative Yes
The information submitted reflects all relevant data received.
If additional relevant information is received, a supplemental
report will be submitted.
Event Description
It was reported that a carelink patient followed at another
practice in a different state had a transmission continue to
pull into this practice’s paceart data exchange log viewer.
The paceart issue was resolved. No patient complications
have been reported as a result of this event.
3/4/2011 Cardiac device
monitoring
system
MEDTRONIC, INC.
PACEART SYSTEM
SOFTWARE
Event Description No
It was reported that a remote transmission of a patient’s
device had discrepancies with the remote event in the
electronic medical records system. No patient complications
have been reported as a result of this event.
Manufacturer Narrative
Security and Privacy in Medical Devices
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events related to health information technology.[19] This much
broader search strategy, also using MAUDE, found that only 0.1%
of nearly 900,000 reports over a 2-year period were related to
health information technology. These problems included a mix of
software malfunctions, system configuration, and human errors.
As with our report, these investigators suggested that the relatively
low rate of findings may reflect known shortcomings of MAUDE,
variability in reporting and the difficulty in even recognizing
device malfunctions that are ‘‘unusual’’ or outside of traditional
notions of device performance. Similarly, they identified a need for
better design of prospective systems for capturing adverse events
specific to the growing complexity of medical devices. Our
contributions differ in two respects. First, our analysis is based on
data from MAUDE as well as the FDA’s Enforcement Reports
and Medical & Radiation Emitting Device Recalls. Second, our
findings concern the issue of revising the current approach to
postmarket surveillance to adequately identify problems related to
the security and privacy of medical devices.
Table 2. Cont.
Product
Problem
category Event Date Device Type Device/Manufacturer Verbatim Text
Adjudicated
Security or
Privacy
Implications?
The information submitted reflects all relevant data received.
If additional relevant information is received,
a supplemental report will be submitted.
5/13/11 Esophageal
stent
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC -
GALWAY ULTRAFLEX
ESOPHAGEAL NG STENT
SYSTEM PROSTHESIS,
ESOPHAGEAL
Manufacturer Narrative No
Although the exact patient age is unknown, the patient was
reported to be over 18 years of age. The complainant
indicated that the device was implanted and will not be
returned for evaluation; therefore, a failure analysis of the
complaint device cannot be completed. If any further relevant
information is identified, a supplemental medwatch will be filed.
Event Description
It was reported to boston scientific corporation that an ultraflex
esophageal covered stent was implanted during an esophageal
stenting procedure on (b)(6), 2011. According to the
complainant, the indication for the stent placement was
esophageal cancer. The label on the packaging of the stent
stated that the stent was 7 cm in length and covered. However,
following the stent placement, the user believed the stent to be
uncovered. The stent position was adjusted with rat-tooth
forceps and the stent was left implanted. There were no patient
complications as a result of this event. The patient condition at
the conclusion of the procedure was reported to be stable.
Attempts to obtain additional information regarding the
circumstances surrounding this event have been unsuccessful to
date. Should additional relevant details become available, a
supplemental report will be submitted.
11/9/2010 Pulmonary
function test
calculator
HOSPIRA POINT OF CARE
SOLUTIONS ENDO TOOD
SOFTWARE
None No
9/3/2010 Automated
white blood cell
differential
counter
ABBOTT DIAGNOSTICS
DIVISION CELL-DYN
SAPPHIRE ANALYZER
AUTOMATED
HEMATOLOGY ANALYZER
Event Description No
The customer observed that occasionally, barcoded patient
samples processed using a cell-dyn sapphire analyzer would be
incorrectly mismatched to the specimen id number and wrong
patient name. Sample (b)(6) was replicated by the cd sapphire
and potentially mismatched to an incorrect patient name. The
customer uses a laboratory information system (lis) to further
process patient data. No mismatched results or incorrect reports
were released from the lab. No adverse patient outcomes were
reported related to this issue.
Manufacturer Narrative
(b)(4). An investigation is in process. A follow-up report
will be submitted when the investigation is complete.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040200.t002
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strategy may not have been sufficient to identify reports or events
related to privacy or security, although our manual review of
search terms and reports was intentionally broad. All three
databases focus on postmarket events that themselves required
several links in a complex chain to become publicly known. Most
importantly, device problems related to privacy and security must
manifest clinically to become reportable, and by their very nature
these issues may be difficult to detect. However, this strengthens
our suggestion that better prospective mechanisms are needed to
track device performance in this area.
The rapid proliferation of medical devices, and their growing
sophistication, presents Internet-age challenges for multiple
stakeholders. Without an understanding of security and privacy,
it will be difficult for patients and clinicians to establish confidence
in device safety and effectiveness. While this study provides some
comfort in the lack of observed security or privacy breaches, the
related adverse events or device malfunctions are not served well
by the current approach to postmarket surveillance. This
conclusion challenges regulators and manufacturers to carefully
weigh the premarket evaluation of security and privacy elements of
their devices and systems, and to design postmarket systems that
enable effective collection of cybersecurity threat indicators for
medical devices. While intentional interference may be much less
likely to manifest clinically than other types of traditional
malfunctions, it is clear that no effective system exists to detect
signals of security or privacy problems. This conclusion is
confirmed by the sharp contrast of security and privacy problems
tabulated by the VA and the security and privacy problems
tabulated with FDA databases. To detect a security or privacy
problem that could harm patients, a more effective information
sharing system for medical device cybersecurity should be
established.
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